Revolving Door Regulators

Senator yesterday. Lobbyist today.

Representative yesterday. CEO today.

Cabinet level appointee yesterday. Bank Chairperson today.

Government Agency Director yesterday. Law firm senior partner today.

CFPB Regulator yesterday. Competitor today.

_______________________________________________________________________

IN THIS ARTICLE

The Inside-Outside Gambit

The Four Horsemen

A Business Model for Former Regulators

Partners in Business

Making a Market in Non-QM

Timeline

What did they know, and when did they know it?

Extinguishing the Fire

Library

_______________________________________________________________________

The Inside-Outside Gambit

There are many forms of corruption. Perhaps the most pernicious is where an elected or duly appointed representative of the citizenry leaves office to use the sloughed off position for financial gain in the private sector.

Let's set up a definition for such (mostly unregulated) behavior. I will give it a phrase: "inside-outside gambits."

What is an inside-outside gambit? It is the use of information obtained in the course of a former governmental position by an official for financial gain, directly or indirectly, soon or immediately after leaving government employment in that position. Such information includes contacts with decision-makers in the government; providing information about proprietary conversations leading up to the promulgating of laws, rules, and regulations; access to insiders and knowledge of their views; navigating the systemic and organizational structure; non-public facts regarding the governmental plans or condition that could provide a financial advantage. Note that I use the phrase "inside-outside," not "insider trading."

I am not talking about a situation where there is the illegal trading of a public company's stock or other securities (such as bonds or stock options) by individuals with access to non-public information about the subject company (such trading being illegal).

However, the effect of “inside-outside gambit” and “insider trading” is practically the same: these strategies lead to an unfair, usually economic, advantage.

A basic concept of law is that an injury must be sustained by a plaintiff. Broadly speaking, no injury, no case.

So who is harmed when an equity trader uses inside information for personal financial benefit? The public, of course. Certainly, that part of the public that invests in the stock market, relying on rules, regulations, and laws to be impartially applied, with equal access to all. And who is harmed when a former government official uses inside information for personal financial benefit almost immediately after being employed in the government position. Of course, the public. Certainly, that part of the public that relies on rules, regulations, and laws to be impartially applied, with equal access to all.

How about when regulators in the most powerful agency that regulates the origination of residential mortgage loans, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), leave that agency and start a mortgage company soon after leaving the CFPB, to compete or partner with mortgage companies?

When Thomas Jefferson advocated that legislators should have term limits in order to prompt the return to private life in order to live under the rules they promulgated, somehow I don't think this is what he had in mind.

In a letter of 1776, Jefferson wrote:

[His] "reason for fixing them [elected representatives] in office for a term of years rather than for life was that they might have an idea that they were at a certain period to return into the mass of the people and become the governed instead of the governor, which might still keep alive that regard to the public good that otherwise they might perhaps be induced by their independence to forget."

In other words, Jefferson viewed public service as a privilege. He fully expected government officials to return to private life and live under the laws they passed. I quite doubt that he viewed such a return to be a means for an ex-official’s self-enrichment, by utilizing public service to exploit – or even appear to exploit - the very laws promulgated by the ex-official.

_______________________________________________________________________

The Four Horsemen

On July 31, 2013, the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform and the House Committee on Financial Services sent an eight page Congressional letter (Letter) to Richard Cordray, the Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). Signed by a bi-partisan group of Representatives, it expressed concern about the recent departure from the CFPB of four high level officials. The Letter forms the basis of further inquiries by the Committees. Noting a news report, the Representatives indicated it appears that certain officials "have left the CFPB in order to profit from rules they helped create."

Who are these individuals? What were their former CFPB positions?

Loan Originator Compensation: New Rules

On January 24, 2013, as the last of the Final Rules of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) rolled out, I offered an outline of all of them, entitled "CFPB's Gang of Seven (Final Rules)".

I listed them in order of issuance, as follows:

1. Ability-to-Repay (ATR)
2. High-Cost Mortgage (HCM)
3. Escrow
4. Servicing
5. Appraisals for High-Risk Mortgages
6. Copies of Appraisals
7. Mortgage Loan Originator Compensation

Having come through the last two months responding to numerous questions about these Final Rules, I have been able to cobble together some of the most salient questions, regulatory features, and concerns that our clients have expressed about them. And when I have spoken to the media types, it seems that they also have a set of questions and interests that are not being fully addressed in the current dialogue. Of abiding interest is the change relating to loan originator compensation.

With that in mind, I want to provide a brief outline of some loan originator compensation issues, offering additional details garnered from two months in the trenches working through these regulatory issues on behalf of our clients. From time to time, I will have more to discuss about many regulatory changes anticipated in 2013 and 2014. I am going to conduct this review topic by topic, rather than just as specific regulations subject to a final rulemaking. 

____________________________________________________

IN THIS ARTICLE

Terms and Conditions
Retirement Plans
Factors and Proxies
Dual Compensation
Non-loan Originations Services
Points and Fees
Loan Originator Qualifications
Mandatory Arbitration Clause
Single Premium Insurance
Record Retention Requirements

____________________________________________________

Terms and Conditions

By now, there is nary a residential mortgage lender or originator that does not know that, under Regulation Z, loan originator compensation is prohibited from being based upon the terms and conditions of a mortgage loan transaction.

The CFPB has provided new nomenclature for the terminology "transaction terms and conditions," without much changing the prohibition and certain exceptions to the standing rule. The new terminology is "term of a transaction," but now with the clarified meaning that term of a transaction means to include "any right or obligation of the parties to a credit transaction."

The usual cast of regulatory prohibitions continue in force. For instance, loan originator compensation is still prohibited from being based on such things as the interest rate of a loan, or upon the inclusion of additional fees or charges for products or services provided by other parties to the transaction. 

And the usual cast of regulatory identifiers of a term of a transaction continue in force. Thus, fees or charges are a term of the transaction if they must be disclosed in the Good Faith Estimate (GFE) or HUD-1 or HUD-1A Settlement Statement (HUD-1). That obviously means to include loan originator or creditor fees or charges for the credit transaction or for a product or service provided by the loan originator or creditor that is related to the extension of credit; and it also means those fees or charges of other parties for any product or service required by the lender as a condition of the extension of credit. Keep in mind, however, that just because a fee or charge is stated on the HUD-1 does not in itself make the fee or charge a term of the transaction.

One rather controversial area involves the off-setting of compensation due to increased costs. The standing rule has provided that loan originator compensation is prohibited from being reduced in response to a change in the transaction terms. This has caused lenders all manner of frustration, not to mention loss of revenues and diminished profits. Yet, the new rule would allow compensation to be reduced in order to offset unexpected increases to estimated settlement costs, otherwise known as "unforeseen circumstances." What is a circumstance that is unforeseen? The imagination reels! But since the CFPB has offered no formal guidance to delineate very specifically what may or may not be an unexpected event, the lender must be extremely careful not to enter these dark waters too briskly.

____________________________________________________

Retirement Plans

Profits may be used toward contributions to tax advantaged retirement plans. The important feature is to ensure that such contributions are not be based on the terms of the individual loan originator’s transactions. Non-deferred, profit based compensation plans - such as bonus pools and profit-sharing plans - is permissible. However, any such payments (1) must ensure that compensation is not directly or indirectly based on the terms of the individual loan originator’s transactions, and (2) either the compensation under the plan does not exceed 10 percent of the loan originator’s total compensation for the applicable period or the loan originator was an originator for no more than 10 transactions during the preceding 12 months. 

Whatever the choice, the entity involved must ensure that payments do not include bonuses, awards, trips, or other 'incentive' products or services.

____________________________________________________

Factors and Proxies

Although the standing rule provides that loan originator compensation may not be dependent upon a factor that is a “proxy” for what would otherwise be considered a term of a loan transaction, there is clarification now that a factor is a term of a loan transaction “proxy” if it meets these two criteria: (1) the factor varies with a transaction term over a significant number of transactions, and (2) the loan originator, directly or indirectly, has the ability to add, reduce, or change the factor when originating the loan or credit.

____________________________________________________

Ability-to-Repay: Regulating or Underwriting?

EXCERPT # 1 

It seems to me that the imposition of an ability-to-repay requirement as a regulatory mandate is an admission that market forces cannot discipline lenders or incentivize lenders to act in their own self-interest.

This is an obvious shift in liabilities, because this mandate shifts the burden of compliance to the lenders in order to assure that their contractually bound borrowers can pay back their loans. Parties to any contract can become adversaries!

In other words, the relationship between the creditor and the borrower is innately affected and extensively undermined by this Rule, inasmuch as it imposes a new kind of theory for a regulatory framework and, in my estimation, infantilizes lenders by making them comply with a regulator's ad hoc way of rationing the extension of credit. 

ABILITY-TO-REPAY: REGULATING OR UNDERWRITING? (Part II)

EXCERPT # 2

If the rationing of credit is meted out through this regulatory construct, it can be legitimately asserted as well that lenders are not arms-length, contractual counterparties; that is, lenders now will have a duty to assess a prospective borrower's ability to repay, irrespective of collateral value and securitization.

This change in the dynamics between and the inherent, due diligence tension among the parties to a residential mortgage transaction raise serious issues about the systemic consequences soon to be engendered. 

ABILITY-TO-REPAY: REGULATING OR UNDERWRITING? (Part II)